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11 Introduction
There has been considerable attention focused on public sector debt levels and debt
sustainability in recent years. Debt:GDP levels rose dramatically in many countries
following the measures taken to deal with the recent ﬁnancial and economic crisis,
from around 65% at the beginning of 2008 to nearer 80% at the end of 2009 in the
EU for example.1 Concern has been expressed over many countries’ ability to service
such high debt levels both in the media and in the ﬁnancial markets and, within the
EU countries, rescue packages totalling some 920 billion euro were agreed in May
2010 to protect against the fears of sovereign debt default and state insolvency. In
September 2010, wide-ranging legislation was introduced to reinforce the economic
governance of the EU, strengthening the principles behind the Stability and Growth
Pact, allowing for more detailed surveillance of EU countries’ ﬁscal and other macro-
economic policies over the business cycle and for stronger enforcement of sanctions
against member states failing to comply with the newly-deﬁned concept of prudent
ﬁscal policy-making.2
Given the political and economic signiﬁcance of the issues surrounding public-
sector debt management, the empirical literature investigating public sector debt dy-
namics at the macroeconomic level is surprisingly sparse. There is a voluminous
theoretical literature concerned with the characteristics of optimal ﬁscal policies but
this often relates only loosely to explanations of observed public sector debt levels over
the long run or over the cycle. As discussed below, there have been various attempts
to relate the time series properties of debt levels to debt sustainability and there is,
of course, continuous and detailed analysis of the sustainability of public ﬁnances
in EU countries provided by the European Commission (see, for example, European
1To place these ﬁgures in context though, we note that debt burdens in the EU rose from around
35% in 1980 to around 75% in the mid- 1990’s.
2For details, see the statement by the Economic and Financial Aﬀairs Directorate of the
European Commission "A new EU economic governance - a comprehensive Commission pack-
age of proposals" at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/articles/eu_economic_situation/2010-
09-eu_economic_governance_proposals_en.htm.
[1]Commission, 2009, 2010). But, as noted in Trehan and Walsh (1991), the interpre-
tation of the empirical ﬁndings in the early time series work was controversial, while
the analyses of debt sustainability are typically based on complicated and potentially
contentious structural models that are diﬃcult to interpret. Further, much of this
work has focused on countries taken in isolation or in turn and it is often diﬃcult to
identify the eﬀects of the cross-country interdependencies that are so important to
understanding debt sustainability in the eurozone and many other parts of the world.3
This paper provides a simple characterisation of the time series properties of the
debt:GDP ratios in ten EU countries over the period 1982-2009. It establishes that
shocks to debt ratios persist over time and focuses on measuring the size and source
of the permanent shocks to the debt ratios. The paper also provides “persistence
proﬁles” which characterise the eﬀects of the permanent shocks on countries’ debt as
the eﬀects evolve over time. The analysis is undertaken in the context of a multivari-
ate VAR so that the interdependencies between countries’ debt ratios are properly
taken into account. The analysis shows that public sector debt dynamics in the
EU10 are complicated, involving important inter-country interactions and protracted
adjustment periods, of the order of ten years, in response to shocks. Shocks to eco-
nomic growth have direct and permanent eﬀects on the ratio which accumulate over
time to contribute to the complexity of public debt dynamics. We also ﬁnd evidence
of asymmetries in the eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of ‘ﬁscal consolidation’, with unan-
ticipated reductions in government spending having a more permanent eﬀect than
unanticipated increases in government revenue.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the liter-
ature concerned with the time series characterisation of public sector debt dynamics
and describes the modelling techniques we use to measure the size of the permanent
eﬀects of shocks to debt and to obtain the associated persistence proﬁles. Section 3
3Notable exceptions include Feve and Henin’s (2000) analysis of debt in the G7 economies and
Afonso and Rault’s (2010) analysis of debt:GDP ratios in the EU.
[2]presents the results of the analysis of innovations in debt ratios applied to the EU10
countries, ignoring the nature of the shocks at ﬁrst and then focusing on the source
of shocks. Section 4 concludes.
2 Public Sector Debt Dynamics
2.1 Debt over the Business Cycle
The time series properties of the debt:GDP ratio depend on the characteristics of the
shocks hitting the economy and the way government policy reacts to those shocks. In
turn the government reaction is determined by its objectives and constraints, including
its ability to generate revenues and to sell public bonds. In recent years a large
number of countries have adopted various types of ﬁscal rules (IMF, 2009). These
self-imposed constraints aim principally at ensuring long-term sustainability of public
ﬁnances, although in some cases other objectives -e.g. keeping the size of the public
sector relatively small- also played a role. Often the rules explicitly state ceilings for
the debt:GDP and deﬁcit:GDP ratios; Eurozone countries are subject to the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), which limits the deﬁcit:GDP ratio to 3% and the debt:GPD
ratio to 60%, for example.
The 60% limit in the SGP is of the order of magnitude suggested in Aiyagari and
McGrattan (1998).4 They provide a model in which heterogeneous agents are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks and borrowing constraints. The latter imply that government
debt is not neutral, and enhances the ability of individuals to smooth income. The op-
timal debt policy optimises trade-oﬀs between consumption smoothing, crowding out,
wealth redistribution and work disincentives. Their numerical exercises (calibrated on
the US economy) suggest that a debt:GDP ratio in the region of 66% would maximise
welfare (although welfare losses are small throughout the range 40%-100%). 5
4Although we are not claiming that this is how that ceiling was calculated.
5Interestingly, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2010) analysis of long samples of data for many countries
[3]If the model of Aiyagari and McGrattan is a good approximation of reality, the
debt:GDP ratio should be stationary around the optimal level. Alternative models,
however, suggest that the optimal level of debt will have a unit root. Using a model
in which Ricardian equivalence holds, Barro (1979) argued that the optimal ﬁscal
policy implies smoothing out intertemporally the burden of taxation. This implies
that the eﬀect of a temporary positive shock on government spending, say, will be
a relative small but persistent increase in taxation rather than an higher but short-
lived increase that matches the increase in expenditure. As a result, the level of debt
will be permanently higher, indicating unit root properties in the debt series. In full
stochastic general equilibrium models Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), and Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2006) also ﬁnd that an optimal ﬁscal policy implies that public
debt follows a random walk. From a theoretical perspective, the high persistence
result hinges on the assumptions of no crowding out and incomplete asset markets.
In models with complete asset markets, the government can issue state contingent
debt to smooth the burden of taxation across states rather than over time. The
optimal policy then implies that the level of debt is as persistent as the shocks (Lucas
and Stokey, 1983; Aiyagari et al. 2002). Thus the theoretical literature is somewhat
inconclusive on the behaviour of public debt over the business cycle even when a fully
optimising government is assumed, although Marcet and Scott (2009) have recently
argued that the empirical evidence from the analysis of the persistence of US debt
yields more support to Barro’s hypothesis than to Lucas and Stockey’s.
The discussion above suggests that the debt:GDP ratio may have a unit root.
But even in models based on optimising governments, there is a recognition that debt
cannot grow without bounds. For example, to derive their main results, Aiyagari et al.
(2002) impose exogenous limits on the value the stock of debt. Other authors try to
explain the limits to debt accumulation within the model. In the literature on strategic
default, where debt repudiation is an option for the borrower limits to debt levels are
indicates that debt ratios in excess of 90% have substantial eﬀects on growth.
[4]determined by the optimum lending strategies (see, for example, Eton and Gersovitz,
1981, Cohen and Sachs, 1986; or Arellano, 2008). An alternative explanation of
the determinants of deﬁcits and debt, stresses the importance of political economy
considerations. This vast literature is surveyed by Alesina and Perotti (1995) and
Eslava (2006). One may then conjecture that debt:GDP ratios are likely to display
a unit root within a certain range of values, although their behaviour may change
signiﬁcantly at more extreme value.6
A further element that is likely to make the statistical properties of the series
we study even more complex is the high level of interdependence among European
countries. In countries that are closely integrated through trade, cyclical ﬂuctuations
in one country will be very quickly reﬂected in those of the other countries. Discre-
tionary and automatic ﬁscal responses to the common elements of cyclical ﬂuctuations
will be reﬂected in similar movements in debt:GDP ratios. With integrated ﬁnancial
markets, a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion in one country increases the total supply
of bonds and raises the interest rate faced by that country and by all other countries
if bonds issued by diﬀerent sovereigns are seen as substitutes. Interest payments and
debt:GDP ratios in all countries rise. Further spillovers may be present when solvency
is an issue. When one country’s solvency is in question, investors may fear a run on
other highly indebted governments. Interest rates on these bonds can rise sharply
while yields on less indebted countries’ bonds may fall. And, in the context of a
monetary union, a further channel may operate through the “ﬁscal theory of the price
level.” This theory argues that unsustainable ﬁscal policies result in the central bank
loosing control over inﬂation despite a commitment to an explicit target. Anticipation
of future inﬂation would raise nominal interest rates for all countries, including those
with sustainable policies. These inﬂuences from one country to another mean that
the eﬀects of shocks to the debt ratio in one country is very likely to permeate across
6In our empirical work we assume that the time-series properties of the data do not change, i.e.
that the observed levels are within the range just alluded to.
[5]countries and the cumulative eﬀects of the feedbacks can generate larger and more
prolonged adjustments.
Given that the theoretical literature fails to oﬀer sharp and uncontroversial pre-
dictions of how ﬁscal policy would or should look like, it is perhaps not surprising
that applied work has often focused on the least controversial aspect included in most
theoretical models; namely the intertemporal budget constraints. A large literature
has developed, that tries to derive and test empirically testable implications of the
constraint. For example, Hamilton and Flavin (1986)’s early tests of government sol-
vency involved checking the stationarity of the deﬁcit and debt processes, but Trehan
and Walsh (1991) and Bohn (2007) demonstrate that the debt or debt:GDP series
can be integrated of any order without violating the intertemporal budget constraint.
The intuition is that household’s optimising behaviour requires that the expected
discounted value of the stock of debt converges to zero in the long run. When this
transversality condition is satisﬁed, the existing level of debt must be equal to the
expected discounted sum of future surpluses. When the time series of surpluses is
stationary, the expected discounted sum of future surpluses is stationary, and the
budget constraint is satisﬁed only if the debt series is also stationary (this is the case
analysed by Hamilton and Flavin). However, the assumption that the surplus is sta-
tionary is unnecessarily restrictive and more generally, the time series of debt can be
integrated of any order and remain sustainable. This is because the n-period ahead
forecast of the level of debt increase at most as a polynomial of time of order n, while
the discount factor increases exponentially. Hence their ratio will converge to zero
(Bohn, 2007).
2.2 Characterising Public Sector Debt Dynamics
The discussion in the previous section suggests that characterising public sector debt
dynamics is not straightforward. Countries’ debt:GDP ratios are each likely to show
[6]unit root properties and are likely to be related to each other. An important feature
of the series is their long-run properties so that the ‘persistence’ of shocks (measuring
the inﬁnite-horizon eﬀect of a shock to the ratio) is a key statistic. But the dynamic
paths are likely to be complex so that it is also useful to characterise the time path
of the eﬀects of shocks.
The dynamics of debt:GDP ratios in a group of countries can usefully be modelled
through a simple vector autoregression (VAR) explaining the growth in the ratio of
each country in terms of its own recent past and the past values of the growth in the
ratios in related countries. The persistence of shocks to the countries’ ratios can be
investigated using the measures developed in Lee, Pesaran and Pierse (1992, 1993)
and the time paths of the eﬀects of shocks can be investigated through the persis-
tence proﬁles described in Lee and Pesaran (1993). Here, denoting the (logarithm of)
debt:GDP ratio in country i at time t by bit, and assuming that bit is integrated of
order 1 (I(1)), we can characterise the time series of the countries’ ratios by the Wold
representation:
∆bt =   + C(L)εt (2.1)
where bt = (b1t, b2t,..., bmt)′ is the m × 1 vector containing the debt ratios for the
m countries of interest,   is a vector of constants representing mean growth rates,
C(L) = I+C1L+..+CpLp is a p-order matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, Cj
are m×m matrices of parameters and εt is the m×1 one-step-ahead forecast errors in
∆bt given information on lagged values of ∆bt. The εt are serially uncorrelated with
mean zero and covariance  . The representation in (2.1) will be valid whether or not
there is cointegration among the individual bit series, although its presence will imply
restrictions on the long-run matrix C(1) and, where the model is approximated in
estimation through a ﬁnite order VAR, the cointegrating vectors should be included
in the model to avoid misspeciﬁcation.
The representation in (2.1) can capture complicated cross-country interdependen-
[7]cies, including the eﬀect of innovations to countries’ debt that are correlated contem-
poraneously (through  ) and the feedbacks across the countries’ debt ratios over time
(through the Ci), and so provides a very useful vehicle with which to describe debt-
dynamics. It is, of course, subject to the usual limitation of multivariate time series
models that there are an inﬁnite number of MA representations of this type and that
a structural interpretation of the innovations or parameters requires (a typically large
number of) identifying restrictions provided by economic theory. On the other hand,
the simple reduced form representation of (2.1) can be readily used to describe the
way in which the εt innovations are propagated over time if we are simply interested
in characterising the countries’ debt dynamics.
Speciﬁcally, following Lee and Pesaran (1993), we note that important features of
debt dynamics will be captured by the m × m matrix P whose (i,j)-th element is
given by
ρij =
e′
iC(1) C(1)′ej ￿
(e′
iC(0) C(0)′ei)(e′
jC(0) C(0)′ej)
, i,j = 1,...,m, (2.2)
where ei is the m×1 selection vector with unity in its i-th element and zeros elsewhere.
The “persistence matrix” P provides a variance-based measure of the inﬁnite-horizon
eﬀect of shocks to the system. It is most easily interpreted by considering the measures
Pi = √ρii based on its diagonal elements. These measures shows the size of the
permanent eﬀect on debt in county i of a shock to the system that causes debt in
that country to rise by 1% on impact. 7 In the univariate case, the measure coincides
with the "impulse-based" measure of persistence, describing the inﬁnite horizon eﬀect
of a 1% shock to the variable, and the two concepts are clearly related therefore.
However, the variance-based measure has the advantage that it does not require, and
7The focus throughout the analysis, including below where shocks of particular types are consid-
ered, is on the eﬀects of system-wide shocks. This recognises that, in the context of inter-related
economies like those of the EU, decisions that eﬀect debt in one country eﬀect debt ratios in all
countries even if the decisions are taken unilaterally.
[8]indeed is invariant to, the identifying assumptions necessary to provide structural
meaning to the shocks in an impulse response analysis conducted in a multivariate
setting (see Lee and Pesaran, 1993, for further discussion). The moving average
representation at (2.1) accommodates the possibility that the instantaneous eﬀect of
shocks are gradually eroded over time so that the persistence measure can be close
to or equal to zero (as it would be if the debt ratio series was actually stationary).
The Pi therefore provides a continuous measure of the extent of the permanent eﬀect
of shocks to country i’s debt, elaborating in a useful way on the usual dichotomous
characterisation between I(0) and I(1) series.8
The derivation of the Pi measures suggest two straightforward extensions to pro-
vide further insight on the persistent eﬀects of shocks. First we note that the time-
proﬁle of the eﬀect of shocks measured by Pi at the of the inﬁnite-horizon can be
readily traced over time, deﬁning P(n) as the matrix whose (i,j)-th element is given
by
ρij(n) =
e′
iH(n)′ej ￿
(e′
iC(0) C(0)′ei)(e′
jC(0) C(0)′ej)
, (2.3)
where H(n) =
￿￿n
i=0 Ci
￿
 
￿￿n
i=0 Ci
￿′
for n = 0,1,...... Here, the H(n) capture
the size of the permanent eﬀects of the shocks as they accumulate over time up
to period n. Clearly, the P(n) converge to the persistence matrix P as n → ∞
and the “persistence proﬁles”, deﬁned by the individual country-speciﬁc measures
Pi(n) =
￿
ρii(n), also converge to Pi as n → ∞. These proﬁles will provide a useful
characterisation of public sector debt dynamics which again avoids the need for any
potentially contentious structural assumptions necessary in impulse response analysis.
The second extension, again described in detail in Lee and Pesaran (1993), allows
8As noted above, debt increases can be sustainable even if they are stationary so that it would be
incorrect to make a one-to-one correspondence between sustainability and zero persistence. On the
other hand, we also noted that, realistically, rising debt levels become increasingly hard to tolerate
politically and in the ﬁnancial markets so that countries’ are more vulnerable to solvency problems
if increases in debt have large permament eﬀects. In this sense, then, the persistence measures also
provide an index of “debt unsustainability”.
[9]for a decomposition of the shocks to debt in the simple Wold representation of (2.1)
so that we might describe the way in which diﬀerent types of system-wide shocks
impact on countries’ debt and how their eﬀects are propagated over time. Speciﬁcally,
suppose xt is a vector of EU-wide aggregates that will impact, in diﬀerent ways and
over diﬀerent time scales, on debt in the EU economies; the vector might include EU
output growth, say, so that we can explicitly consider the eﬀect of a slowdown in
growth on the individual countries’ debt ratios. Assume that the innovations in these
aggregates are given by
vt = xt − Γzt (2.4)
with mean zero and variance Ψ and where the Γ are ﬁxed parameters and the zt are
a set of predetermined variables. Then we can generalise (2.1) to write
∆bt =   + D(L)vt + C(L)εt, (2.5)
where D(L) = I + D1L + .. + DqLq is a matrix of lag polynomials capturing the
eﬀects of the identiﬁed system-wide shocks and the εt are now interpreted as ‘other,
unidentiﬁed’ innovations to debt assumed to be uncorrelated with the vt. In this case,
the matrix P(n) is deﬁned by its (i,j)-th element in a way that can be decomposed:
ρij(n) = ρSj(n) + ρOij(n) (2.6)
where
ρSij(n) =
e′
iF(n)′ej ￿
(e′
iH(0)ei)(e′
jH(0)′ej)
, ρOij(n) =
e′
iG(n)′ej ￿
(e′
iH(0)ei)(e′
jH(0)ej)
,
F(n) =
￿￿n
i=0 Di
￿
Ψ
￿￿n
i=0 Di
￿′
G(n) =
￿￿n
i=0 Ci
￿
 
￿￿n
i=0 Ci
￿′
, and H(n) =
￿￿n
i=0 Di
￿
Ψ
￿￿n
i=0 Di
￿′
+
￿￿n
i=0 Ci
￿
 
￿￿n
i=0 Ci
￿′
for n = 0,1,.... The proﬁles
described by PSi(n) =
￿
ρSii(n) and POi(n) =
￿
ρOii(n) summarise the eﬀects of the
[10]identiﬁed EU-wide shocks and the unidentiﬁed shocks on each countries’ debt, and
the scaling reﬂects the size of the identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed shocks on impact (but
with their total impact eﬀect still equal to unity).
3 Public Sector Debt in the EU10
This section provides estimates of the multi-country model of debt dynamics described
in the previous section for ten EU countries over the period 1982-2009. The coun-
tries are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Finland and the UK (the ‘EU10’), which constitute the EU countries for which data
was available on a consistent basis over the sample period. Details of the series are
provided in the Data Appendix. In what follows, we provide an overview of the data
focusing on the unit root properties of the debt:GDP series. We then report the
results obtained from estimated multi-country models of debt:GDP growth, describ-
ing the characterisation of the series through various estimated VAR models and the
associated persistence proﬁles.
3.1 Data overview
Figure 1 plots the debt:GDP series for each of the EU10 countries over the last thirty
years or so. The countries’ experiences are clearly distinct both in terms of the levels
of debt:GDP (ranging from as low as 14% in Finland at the beginning of the sample
to as high as 135% in Belgium in the mid-nineties, for example) and in terms of the
evolution of the series over time. However, the simple average of the ratios across the
countries has a reasonably clear pattern which provides some context: the average
ratio starts at its lowest level of 48% in 1982 and rises through a period of high
government spending in the eighties to a peak of 75% in 1995 before falling back to
59% in 2007. The ﬁnancial crisis saw large rises in the ratio during the ﬁnal two years
of the sample, with the average rising to 64% in 2008 and 72% in 2009.
[11]Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests on
debt:GDP and growth of debt:GDP. Table 1.1 demonstrates that the unit root hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected for debt:GDP levels in any country or using any order of
augmentation in the ADF test. Following Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), the IPS tests
statistic shows the standardised value of the mean of the ADF statistics across coun-
tries. When compared to the standard normal distribution, the IPS statistic provides
a more powerful test of the unit root based on all of the countries taken together
and, in this case, the more powerful test conﬁrms the conclusion of the individual
countries. The ADF tests for the growth of debt:GDP in Table 1.2 present a more
mixed picture considering the country-speciﬁc results in isolation. But the IPS test
statistics reject the unit root at all lag-lengths providing strong evidence to reject the
unit root hypothesis in growths.
In Tables 2.1 and 2.2, we present the corresponding Cross-sectional Augmented
Dickey-Fuller(CADF) tests for unit roots on both level and growth of debt:GDP ra-
tios. These tests augment the underlying ADF regressions with lagged diﬀerences of
the cross-section average, thereby taking into account the cross-sectional interdepen-
dencies across countries’ debt:GDP ratios that are likely to exist in this context; see
Pesaran (2007). The ﬁndings of Table 1.1-1.2 are conﬁrmed: tests carried out on the
level of debt:GDP cannot reject the hypothesized unit root for any country consid-
ered individually for almost any lag-length, and the overall result is conﬁrmed by the
cross-sectional IPS (CIPS) test statistics; and for the growths, there is rejection of
the null at 5% signiﬁcance level for 7 out of 10 countries for at least one of the CADF
tests, and the CIPS tests rejects the null for lag orders up to three. Taken together,
the results provide strong evidence to reject a unit root in the debt:GDP ratio and to
treat the growth of debt:GDP as a stationary variable for all countries.
[12]3.2 The Multi-country model
The characterisation of the EU10’s debt:GDP data , and the analysis of the persis-
tent eﬀects of shocks to these, is provided by the following simple regression models
estimated for each country and stacked in each case to obtain a multi-country VAR:
M2 : ∆bit = αi +
r ￿
s=1
βs,ii ∆bi,t−s +
r ￿
s=1
γs,i ∆b−i,t−s + εit, i = 1,.....,m (3.7)
M3 :
a restricted version of M2, where variables with coeﬃcients with a
t-ratio below unity (in absolute value) are excluded
(3.8)
M4 : ∆bit = αi +
r ￿
s=1
βs,ii ∆bi,t−s + εit, i = 1,.....,m (3.9)
M5 : ∆bit = αi + εit, i = 1,.....,m (3.10)
A completely unrestricted VAR model (M1) would be one in which ∆bit was regressed
on its own lags and on the lags of debt growth in all the other countries individually.
But estimation of such a model, even with a relatively short lag order, is impractical
given the length of data series available. Our most general model is therefore Model
M2 which is a VAR of order r which explains ∆bit in terms of lagged debt growth in
country i and lags of debt growth in the rest of the EU10 zone, denoted by ∆b−i,t =
m ￿
j=1,j =i
∆bj,t. Model M3 imposes restrictions on M2 by excluding insigniﬁcant variables
to obtain a more parsimonious characterisation of the data. M4 is also a restricted
version of M2, imposing mr restrictions on M2 by removing the aggregate debt:GDP
growth rates from the regressions to exclude the possibility of capturing cross-country
interactions. Model M5 represents the simplest model in which (log) debt to GDP
ratio in each country is represented by a random walk with drift.
The four models were estimated for the EU10 over the period 1982-2009 using Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Log-likelihood values and likelihood ratio
tests are reported in Table 3. Tests to judge the order of the lag necessary to capture
the time series properties of the data in Model M2 suggested including two lags of
[13]individual country and aggregate debt:GDP growth i.e., r=2. The total number of
estimated parameters, not including those in the variance-covariance matrix, is 50
which is clearly very highly-parameterised. Model M3 is more parsimonious, having
dropped variables with t-ratios of less than unity, and the likelihood ratio test estab-
lishes the legitimacy of the restrictions imposed: the test statistic takes the value of
7.5 and is compared to the χ2
15 distribution. In contrast, models M4 and M5 are easily
rejected against both M3 and M2, establishing that these latter models capture the
dynamics of debt:GDP series well (compared to a benchmark random walk model)
and that it is important to explicitly take into account the cross-country interactions
in the model to capture these dynamics.
Having calculated the individual country regressions and stacked these into a VAR,
the model can be inverted to obtain the corresponding moving average model de-
scribed in (2.1) and the associated persistence measures. Table 4 reports the estimates
of individual countries’ and aggregate persistence measures deﬁned in (2.2) based on
models M2 and M3. All the persistence measures are estimated reasonably precisely,
with the measures based on M3 slightly better deﬁned following the elimination of in-
signiﬁcant variables as described above. The persistence measure for the EU10 taken
together, based on our preferred model M3, takes the value 2.87, indicating that a
shock that causes the debt:GDP ratio to rise by 1% on impact will cause the ratio to
rise by 2.87% at the inﬁnite horizon. This is based on the historical time series and
so takes into account the eﬀects of the shock as they are propagated over time includ-
ing all the macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms and feedbacks that have operated
historically (including the subsequent eﬀects on growth, interest rates, government
spending plans, and so on). To place the value of 2.87 in perspective, the rise in the
average debt:GDP ratio across the EU10 from 64% to 72% observed in 2009 would
translate into a long term rise in the ratio to 87% if the whole of the initial change
was the result of an unanticipated shock, assuming that there are no further shocks
and that the EU10’s macroeconomic response is the same as it has been in the past.
[14]The measures in the Table also show that there is considerable variability in the
persistence of shocks across countries, with measures of persistence ranging from 1.57
for Portugal to 3.52 for the UK based on our preferred model M3, for example. This
variability is illustrated graphically in Figure 2 which shows each country’s persis-
tence proﬁle, as deﬁned in (2.3), scaled to show the eﬀect of a shock that causes the
debt:GDP ratio to rise by 1% on impact. The proﬁles trace out the eﬀects of shocks
to ratios as they evolve over time as well as describing the inﬁnite horizon eﬀect and
therefore show that there are substantial diﬀerence in the dynamic response to shocks
as well as in the ultimate eﬀect. The eﬀects of shocks in some countries appear rea-
sonably smooth and monotonic, but there are many countries in which the short-run
eﬀects exceed the long run eﬀect reﬂecting the complexity and delays involved in the
macroeconomic and policy responses to unanticipated movements in the debt ratio.
The eﬀects of the shocks are also very prolonged in all countries, with the proﬁles
settling to their long-run levels only after around ten years. The fact that countries
tend to stabilize at the new level at more or less the same time reﬂects the importance
of the feedbacks from debt growth in the rest of the EU10 to each individual country,
emphasising once again the importance of the interactions across countries.
It is worth noting that the persistence measures of Table 4 and the associated
proﬁles in Figure 2 are all scaled to show the eﬀect of a shock which causes the
debt:GDP ratio to rise in that country by 1% on impact. They provide a good
characterisation of the dynamic eﬀects of shocks, therefore, but do not in themselves
provide information on the shocks that have impacted on countries’ ratios in practice.
Figure 3 provides some information on this by plotting the Beveridge-Nelson (BN)
trends in the debt:GDP ratio based on the estimate of model M3 alongside the actual
ratios themselves. The BN trend associated with the model in (2.1) is deﬁned by
￿ bt = ￿ bt−1 +   + C(1)εt so that it evolves through time accumulating the inﬁnite-
horizon eﬀect of the innovations to the series. It is eﬀectively the inﬁnite-horizon
forecast of the series obtained once the eﬀects of past shocks have worked their way
[15]through the system and in the absence of any subsequent innovations. The BN trend
is therefore readily interpreted as the ‘steady-state’ debt:GDP ratio at each point in
time.
Figure 3 shows the estimated values of the BN trends based on the parameters
and estimated residuals obtained from the estimated model M3 obtained across the
EU10.9 To locate the trends in levels, it is assumed in the ﬁgure that debt:GDP
ratios were all at steady-state in the year 2000.10 The ﬁgure illustrates the changes
in the BN trend over the sample (based on ￿   + ￿ C(1)￿ εt) and so reﬂects both the size
of the persistence measures in each country and the size of the shocks the countries
have experienced. The ﬁgures show a decline in the steady-state levels of the ratio
over the thirty -year sample for most of the EU10 countries but the implications of
the measures taken to deal with the ﬁnancial and economic crisis of recent years for
the increase in the steady-state debt:GDP ratios in most countries are very striking.
Steady state ratios rose by 35 percentage points on average across the EU10 over the
ﬁnal two years of the sample, rising from 60% to 82% in Germany, for example; from
65% to 106% in France; from 94% to 142% in Italy; from 60% to 90% in Portugal;
and from 41% to 89% in UK.
3.3 The source of shocks
This section focuses on the decomposition of shocks and their contribution to persis-
tence following the discussion around (2.4) and (2.5). The analysis takes as its start
point model M2 where the shock in (3.7) has been decomposed into p diﬀerent types
9The model provides the BN trends for bit, the logarithm of the debt:GDP ratio. These are
transformed to obtain the measures of the ratios themselves.
10This is a relatively arbitrary assumption although it can be argued that most countries were
close to their steady-state in the run up to, or at least shortly after, the adoption of the Stability
and Growth Pact in 1997.
[16]of identiﬁed shock, υj,t , j = 1,..,p, and an unidentiﬁed ￿ εit shocks as follows:
˜
M2: ∆bit = αi+
r ￿
s=1
￿ βs,ii∆bi,t−s+
r ￿
s=1
￿ γs,i∆b−i,t−s+
p ￿
j=1
r ￿
s=0
δi,jsυj,t−s+￿ εit, i = 1,.....,m,
(3.11)
where m = 10 and r = 2, as before, and p is the number of explicitly identiﬁed shocks.
In what follows, we consider four types of explicitly-identiﬁed shocks impacting on
variables that aﬀect directly the evolution of the debt:GDP ratio; namely, shocks
to interest payments in the EU10 (Gr
t); shocks to EU10 output (Yt); shocks to EU10
primary government expenditure (GE
t ); and shocks to EU10 government revenue (Rt).
We identiﬁed the shocks from simple speciﬁcations regressing each variable on its own
lag as follows:
∆xj,t = λ0j + λ1j ∆xj,t−1 + υj,t, j = 1,.....,4, (3.12)
where xj,t is the (logarithm of) Gr
t, Yt, GE
t and Rt in turn. Model ￿ M2 consists of
(3.11) and (3.12) which can be estimated jointly using FIML. Model ￿ M3 is similar
but obtained following a speciﬁcation search in which lagged variables with coeﬃcients
with t-values below unity (in absolute value) were removed from (3.11) to improve
parsimony. In either case, the estimated model can be inverted to obtain the estimate
of the moving average form of (2.5) and the estimates of the associated persistence
proﬁles described in (2.6).
Table 5 shows the results of the decomposition of the countries’ and aggregate
persistence measures by type of shock obtained on the basis of the estimated version
of model ￿ M3. The ‘total’ persistence measures given in the ﬁnal column are broadly
comparable to those in Table 4, if not slightly higher, with the persistence of shocks
to the EU10-area as a whole taking a value of 3.01 (standard error 0.53) compared
to the corresponding value of 2.87 (0.69) in Table 4. The individual country-speciﬁc
measures are also broadly similar across the two tables.
[17]In terms of the source of shocks, we see that the identiﬁed shocks, taken together,
have broadly the same persistence as the other ‘unidentiﬁed’ shocks (with measures
of 3.14 and 2.76 at the EU10-area level respectively). There is considerable varia-
tion between the persistence measures of the identiﬁed shocks however: the shocks
to income and to primary expenditure have large and statistically signiﬁcant persis-
tence measures (at 2.89 and 1.74 respectively), while the shocks to interest payments
and to primary revenues are small and statistically insigniﬁcant (at 0.44 and 0.65
respectively). There is evidence, therefore, of signiﬁcant asymmetries in the eﬀects
of diﬀerent forms of ‘ﬁscal consolidation’, with reductions in government spending
having a more permanent eﬀect than increases in government income. Unanticipated
business cycle ﬂuctuations which directly change the ratio on impact also have perma-
nent, long-term eﬀects but unanticipated changes in interest payments do not seem
to play a major role in causing persistent shifts in debt:GDP ratios.
4 Concluding Comments
The paper provides an empirical characterisation of the time series properties of
debt:GDP ratios in the EU10 countries since the early eighties. The evidence is
that the eﬀect of shocks to debt ratios involves complicated cross-country dynamics,
with adjustments in response to a shock taking up to ten years and with the ratio
often overshooting its long-run level in the short-run. Ultimately, the long-run eﬀect
of a shock is to raise the ratio permanently, with the ﬁnal eﬀect being around three
times the eﬀect of the initial shock across the region. Diﬀerent types of shock are
found to have diﬀerent long-run eﬀects, though, with shocks identiﬁed as relating to
government spending and to output growth having large persistent eﬀects and shocks
to interest payments and to government revenues having less persistent eﬀects.11
11This suggests that a long-lived ﬁscal consolidation requires countries to contain their spending
rather than increase taxation. See Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
[18]The evolution over time of the debt:GDP ratio is the outcome of a complicated
set of inter-related decisions involving governments’ tax and spending ambitions and
their need to satisfy their intertemporal budget constraint, the public’s willingness
to hold debt and the ability to pay based on economic growth. A more structural
model would require a description of, at least, the interplay between debt, output,
and interest rates at home and abroad. The time series model of this paper provides a
reduced form characterisation of this outcome reﬂecting the way these decisions have
played out historically. It provides a simple but persuasive characterisation of the
data, and captures well the long phases of rising and falling debt:ratios observed over
the last thirty years. It also suggests that the reaction to the recent ﬁnancial and
economic crisis will see debt:ratios in the EU countries at levels substantially higher
than have been observed for some time.
[19]Data Appendix
The data source for all series is AMECO. Deﬁnitions of the variables in the paper
are given below. All variables are based on individual country data. These are
used directly in the case of the debt:GDP variable and aggregated to obtain EU10-
area measures for the other variables. The aggregation procedure followed AMECO’s
procedure and includes simple or weighted aggregation depending on the variable.
• Bit : Debt:GDP ratio, deﬁned as General government consolidated gross debt
(excessive deﬁcit procedure (based on ESA 1995) and former deﬁnition (linked
series)) expressed as a percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deﬁcit
procedure); AMECO code: 1.0.319.0.UDGGL
• Gr
t : EU-10 Real government interest expenditure is deﬁned as the ratio of
nominal government interest expenditure (deﬁned as Revenue Interest-General
Government - ESA1995, in ECU/EUR; AMECO code: 1.0.99.0.UYIG) and the
GDP price deﬂator(deﬁned as Price deﬂator GDP at market market prices,
ECU/EUR; AMECO code:3.1.99.0.PVGD)
• Yt : EU-10 Real output is deﬁned as the ratio of nominal GDP (deﬁned as
GDP at current market prices: reference level for excessive deﬁcit procedure,
ECU/EUR; AMECO code: 1.0.99.0.UVGDH) and the GDP price deﬂator (de-
ﬁned as above).
• GE
t : EU-10 Real government primary expenditure is deﬁned as the ratio of
nominal General Government Total expenditure (ESA1995), excluding interest
payments( in ECU/EUR; AMECO code: 1.0.99.0.UUTGI) and the GDP price
deﬂator(deﬁned as above).
• Rt : EU-10 Real government revenue is deﬁned as the ratio of nominal Govern-
ment Total revenue (ESA 1995) in ECU/EUR (AMECO code: 1.0.99.0.URTG)
and the GDP price deﬂator(deﬁned as above).
[20]Table 1.1  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Unit Roots on  
National Debt:GDP Ratios, 1984-2009  
 
   
ADF(1) 
 
 
ADF(2) 
 
ADF(3) 
 
ADF(4) 
Belgium  -2.07       -2.03     -1.54     -1.50 
Denmark  -2.46      -1.96     -1.47      -1.77 
Germany  -2.43       -2.64     -2.51     -2.43 
France  -2.36       -2.41       -1.93        -2.09 
Italy  -1.88      -1.75      -1.73      -2.00 
Netherlands  -1.93       -2.02   -1.76    -2.04 
Austria  -2.98      -2.47      -2.41        -1.55 
Portugal  -0.77      -0.58     -0.61   -0.37 
Finland  -2.91       -1.38       -1.97      -2.20 
UK  -2.43      -0.79     -0.80       -1.15 
     
Mean 
(IPS test stat) 
-2.22 
(-0.18) 
-1.80 
(1.06) 
-1.67 
(1.47) 
-1.71 
(1.03) 
 
Notes: The variables are all in logarithms. ADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept, a linear time 
trend and p lagged differences of the dependent variable. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -4.38, –3.60 and -3.24. The IPS 
test statistic is the normalised value of the mean of the ADF statistics and is compared to the standard normal distribution. A ‘*’ 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ‘**’ denotes significance at the 5% level and ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 1.2  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Unit Roots in the Growth of  
National Debt:GDP Ratios, 1984-2009  
 
   
ADF(0) 
 
 
ADF(1) 
 
ADF(2) 
 
ADF(3) 
Belgium -2.02
  -1.86 -1.80 -1.87 
Denmark -2.48  -2.75*  -3.22
** -2.42 
Germany -3.33
**  -2.74* -2.71*  -2.58 
France  -2.34 -2.22 -2.60 -2.39 
Italy -2.01 -2.23 -2.07 -1.69 
Netherlands -3.55
** -2.98*  -2.29  -1.88 
Austria -2.80* -2.90*  -2.38  -3.11
** 
Portugal -4.16
*** -3.68
** -3.27
** -2.45 
Finland -2.10 -3.95
*** -2.22  -1.99 
UK  -0.30 -1.75 -1.48 -1.53 
     
Mean 
(IPS test stat) 
-2.51
*** 
(-3.71)
 
-2.71
*** 
(-4.38) 
-2.40
*** 
(-3.43) 
-2.19
*** 
(-2.60) 
 
Notes: The variables are all in logarithms. ADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept and p lagged 
differences of the dependent variable. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -3.75, –3.00 and -2.63. The IPS test statistic is the 
normalised value of the mean of the ADF statistics and is compared to the standard normal distribution. A ‘*’ denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ‘**’ denotes significance at the 5% level and ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 Table 2.1  
Cross-Sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Unit Roots  
on National Debt:GDP Ratios, 1984-2009  
 
   
CADF(1) 
 
 
CADF(2) 
 
CADF(3) 
 
CADF(4) 
Belgium -4.36
*       -3.82       -2.16       -1.53 
Denmark  -3.21      -2.53       -0.02        0.57 
Germany  -1.64       -0.60        -0.38        -0.26 
France  -3.13       -1.86       -1.84        -1.37 
Italy  -1.32     -1.23     -1.08    -1.52 
Netherlands  -2.31       -1.22        -1.07     -1.24 
Austria -4.66
*       -3.22       -3.31      -2.42 
Portugal  -1.61       -1.51       -2.96       -2.84 
Finland  -3.14       -0.87       -1.12       -1.04 
UK  -0.74       -1.03        -2.13      -2.93 
      
Mean 
(CIPS test stat) 
-2.61    -1.79      -1.61     -1.46 
 
Notes: The variables are all in logarithms. CADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept, a linear time 
trend, p lagged differences of the dependent variable, plus the lagged level and contemporaneous and p lagged differences of the cross-
section average. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -6.40, -4.88 and -3.99. The CIPS test statistic is the cross-section mean, 
compared to the distribution described in Pesaran (2007) where 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -3.15, -2.85 and -2.79. A ‘*’ 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ‘**’ denotes significance at the 5% level and ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level. 
                     
Table 2.2  
Cross-Sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Unit Roots  
in the Growth of National Debt:GDP Ratios, 1984-2009  
 
   
CADF(0) 
 
 
CADF(1) 
 
CADF(2) 
 
CADF(3) 
Belgium  -2.51     
  -2.09      -2.18    -2.43 
Denmark -4.02
**      -3.84
*      -5.30
***     -2.25 
Germany  -2.79      
  -2.40       -1.64     -1.09 
France -4.74
**       -3.62
*       -2.00      -2.70 
Italy -3.79
*        -2.43       -1.57       -1.19 
Netherlands -4.11
**       -2.85       -2.08        -1.76 
Austria  -2.44      -3.34
*        -2.06       -2.36 
Portugal -4.11
**        -3.72
*       -2.78        -1.90 
Finland  -2.82       -4.38
**      -1.33      -1.42 
UK  -1.32        -0.88        -0.54       -1.49 
      
Mean 
(CIPS test stat) 
-3.27
***    -2.96
***     -2.15
*      -1.86 
 
Notes: The variables are all in logarithms. CADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept, p lagged 
differences of the dependent variable, plus the lagged level and contemporaneous and p lagged differences of the cross-section 
average. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -5.75, -3.95 and -3.25. The CIPS test statistic is the cross-section mean, compared to 
the distribution described in Pesaran (2007) where 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -2.60, -2.25 and -2.12. A ‘*’ denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ‘**’ denotes significance at the 5% level and ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Maximised Log-Likelihood Values 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
LLF 
 
N 
 
 
) (
2 r χ  
 
M2 
 
544.05 
 
 
50 
 
- 
 
M3 
 
540.30 
 
 
35 
 
M3 vs M2:  7.5 (15) 
 
M4 
 
 
523.12 
 
30 
 
M4 vs M3:  34.37
*** (5)  
  M4 vs M2:  41.86
*** (20) 
 
 
M5 
 
464.60 
 
 
10 
 
M5 vs M4: 89.66
***  (20) 
M5 vs M3:  151.4
***  (25) 
M5 vs M2:  158.9
***  (40) 
 
 
Notes: Models M2 –M5 defined in the text and estimated over the period 1982-2009. LLR is the maximised log-likelihood value; 
N is the number of estimated coefficients; and 
 
is the likelihood ratio test statistic relating to the r ) (
2 r χ  restrictions imposed 
on model Mi to get to model Mj. A ‘*’ denotes significance at the 10% level, ‘**’ denotes significance at the 5% level and ‘***’ 
denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
 
Table 4  
Individual Countries’ and Aggregate Persistence Measures 
 
 Models
Country  2 M   3 M 
 
Belgium 
 
 
2.29 
(0.54) 
 
2.50 
(0.31) 
 
Denmark 
 
 
1.57 
(0.19) 
 
1.63 
(0.16) 
 
Germany 
 
 
1.82 
(0.33) 
 
1.93 
(0.27) 
 
France 
 
 
2.14 
(0.61) 
 
2.44 
(0.37) 
 
Italy 
 
 
3.04 
(1.18) 
 
3.40 
(0.77) 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
2.49 
(1.20) 
 
2.65 
(1.08) 
 
Austria 
 
 
2.17 
(0.59) 
 
2.31 
(0.29) 
 
Portugal 
 
 
1.33 
(0.16) 
 
1.57 
(0.17) 
 
Finland 
 
 
1.64 
(0.22) 
 
1.86 
(0.28) 
 
UK 
 
 
3.58 
(2.36) 
 
3.52 
(2.41) 
 
EU10-area 
 
 
2.40 
(0.90) 
 
 
2.87 
(0.69) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Results relate to Models M2 and M3 defined in the text and estimated over the period 1982-2009. Individual countries’ 
persistence measures are estimated using (2.2) and the aggregate persistence measure is obtained using vector w, a vector of 
ones, in place of ei and ej. Bracketed figures are asymptotic standard errors calculated using analytic derivates. The formulae 
used are given in Appendix B of PPL. 
 
 
  
Table 5 
Decomposition of Individual Countries’ and Aggregate  
Persistence Measures by Type of Shock 
 
 
Country 
 
Macro Shocks   
Other 
Shocks 
 
Total  DintExp Dy  DExp  DRev   
Total 
Macro 
 
Belgium 
 
 
0.18 
(0.67) 
 
1.87 
(1.07) 
 
0.59 
(0.68) 
 
0.28 
(1.11) 
 
2.23 
(0.42) 
 
2.31 
(0.36) 
 
2.28 
(0.37) 
 
Denmark 
 
 
0.40 
(0.61) 
 
0.89 
(1.06) 
 
1.15 
(0.71) 
 
0.33 
(1.09) 
 
1.68 
(0.47) 
 
1.35 
(0.22) 
 
1.43 
(0.24) 
 
Germany 
 
 
0.59 
(0.32) 
 
2.60 
(0.59) 
 
1.89 
(0.44) 
 
0.06 
(0.52) 
 
3.94 
(0.52) 
 
2.14 
(0.40) 
 
3.64 
(0.70) 
 
France 
 
 
0.09 
(0.51) 
 
2.90 
(0.95) 
 
2.05 
(0.66) 
 
0.52 
(0.85) 
 
3.57 
(0.74) 
 
2.49 
(0.42) 
 
3.22 
(0.63) 
 
Italy 
 
 
0.80 
(1.67) 
 
4.44 
(2.65) 
 
1.99 
(2.08) 
 
4.47 
(2.39) 
 
3.63 
(1.64) 
 
5.76 
(1.28) 
 
4.81 
(1.24) 
 
Netherla
nds 
 
 
1.17 
(0.84) 
 
1.92 
(1.73) 
 
0.23 
(1.33) 
 
0.88 
(1.47) 
 
1.36 
(1.01) 
 
1.85 
(0.41) 
 
1.76 
(0.49) 
 
Austria 
 
 
0.34 
(0.85) 
 
1.91 
(1.60) 
 
2.14 
(1.11) 
 
0.24 
(1.39) 
 
2.96 
(1.22) 
 
1.91 
(0.39) 
 
2.24 
(0.61) 
 
Portugal 
 
 
0.31 
(0.43) 
 
2.15 
(0.88) 
 
0.56 
(0.67) 
 
0.07 
(0.69) 
 
2.15 
(0.80) 
 
1.46 
(0.22) 
 
1.79 
(0.49) 
 
Finland 
 
 
0.46 
(0.50) 
 
2.66 
(1.01) 
 
2.59 
(0.77) 
 
1.19 
(0.85) 
 
3.43 
(0.90) 
 
1.85 
(0.32) 
 
2.72 
(0.68) 
 
UK 
 
 
1.15 
(0.81) 
 
5.36 
(1.65) 
 
1.65 
(1.19) 
 
0.82 
(1.25) 
 
4.91 
(1.67) 
 
2.66 
(0.75) 
 
 
3.89 
(1.17) 
 
EU10-
area 
 
 
0.44 
(0.51) 
 
2.89 
(0.86) 
 
1.74 
(0.60) 
 
0.65 
(0.87) 
 
3.14 
(0.58) 
 
2.76 
(0.44) 
 
3.01 
(0.53) 
 
 
Notes: Results relate to Model M3 defined in the text and estimated over the period 1982-2009. Individual countries’ persistence 
measures are estimated using (2.6) and the aggregate persistence measure is obtained using vector w, a vector of ones, in place of 
ei and ej. Bracketed figures are asymptotic standard errors calculated using analytic derivates. The formulae used are given in 
Appendix B of PPL. 
 
  
 
Figure 1  
Countries’ Debt:GDP ratios 
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Figure 2 
Persistence Profiles measures 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3 
Countries’ Debt:GDP ratios (      ) and Beveridge-Nelson Trends (- - -) 
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